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FOREWORD
Guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a
far vaster political contest, and … no matter how expertly
it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it
cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political
rationale.
Bernard Fall

Contrary to the wave of euphoria following the
collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order
did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare.
In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against
imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist
wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced
revolutionary warfare, although not Mao’s People’s
War model. In view of this assumption, a study of
revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict
between the West and radical jihadism will continue
to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed
states.
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines the
extent to which some states create the conditions for
revolutionary movements to flourish. Employing Jeff
Goodwin’s analytical framework for exploring the
political context behind revolutionary movements,
Lieutenant Colonel Millen explores how the governments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolutionary movements, resulting in these governments’
demise. He supplements Goodwin’s framework by
including an examination of the insurgent leadership’s
political-military acumen.
Lieutenant Colonel Millen extrapolates the politicalmilitary lessons from these conflicts to suggest that the
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United States should minimize the level and type of
assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because
these states possess greater advantages than previously
supposed. The reader will find his analysis compelling.
Often, examining failure provides greater enlightenment than examining success. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this insightful monograph as
a topic of debate among counterinsurgency specialists
and the Department of Defense.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The challenge with writing about revolutionary
movements is that they are largely regarded as
Cold War or decolonization phenomena, and hence
largely irrelevant today. Rhetoric aside, revolutionary
warfare is a struggle for political power over some
defined geographic area regardless of the backdrop.
With this in mind, winning the hearts and minds of
the population is not necessarily an objective of the
insurgents (as the current wars with Islamic extremists
adduce). Although technically a subset of insurgency
warfare, “revolutionary warfare” was often used
interchangeably during the Cold War, perhaps under
the belief that every struggle was somehow part of the
overarching communist wars of national liberation.
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that much of the
literature on insurgency warfare was hyperbolized
to alert Western leaders of the insidious threat to the
Third World. The most noteworthy hindsight is that
few Cold War revolutionary movements actually
conformed to Mao’s People’s War strategy.
Insurgent strategic approaches, as Bard O’Neill
explains in Insurgency and Terrorism, are influenced
by the physical and human environment, popular
support, organization and unity, external support,
and government response. Hence, the end of the Cold
War did not signal the end of revolutionary warfare,
as contemporary Islamic extremist organizations have
demonstrated. Still, as O’Neill points out, even though
an insurgency can present a virulent threat to the
government, there is no guarantee the insurgents will
prevail. In fact, most fail. This fact can serve the United
States regarding counterinsurgency approaches to
client states beleaguered by revolutionary insurgents.
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Understandably, the United States should remain
vigilant to extremist groups which prey on failed states
for a base of operations, but it should also consider the
tremendous advantages even weak states have over
insurgent threats. Foreknowledge of these advantages
can help the United States gauge the level and type of
assistance with confidence rather than the inclination
for direct intervention.
In his book, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary
Movements, 1945-1991, Jeff Goodwin developed an
excellent analytical framework for examining the
political context behind revolutionary movements
and how dysfunctional governance provides the
opportunity for these movements to flourish and
sometimes succeed in overthrowing the state. This
framework can serve as an excellent reference for U.S.
statesmen and government advisors when assessing
the state of affairs of a state engaged in an insurgency.
Goodwin’s political context analysis comprises five
government practices: 1) State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements
or cultural institutions; 2) Repression and/or exclusion
of mobilized groups from state power or resources; 3)
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political
figures; 4) Weak policing capacities and infrastructural
power; and 5) Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule
that alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. It must be stressed that each of these government practices must exist for a revolutionary movement
to have a chance. Goodwin adds that the political
context is not the only factor that leads to revolutionary
movements, but he contends it is the most important
factor. To add greater depth to Goodwin’s framework,
this monograph also examines the competency of the
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insurgent leadership in prosecuting its strategy.
This monograph also examines how governments
can squander their advantages vis-à-vis insurgents
using Goodwin’s framework for the political context
behind revolutionary wars. Accordingly, the author
applies this framework to three case studies: Vietnam
(1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)
to gain a greater appreciation of how government
pathologies, and not insurgent strategy, are the major
determinant of insurgent success.
In each of these cases, the regimes alienated virtually
every sector of society to such an extent that moderate
opposition and eventually popular support fell into
the orbit of extremist organizations out of desperation.
The vast majority of the populace and political elites
may have viewed the revolutionaries with suspicion
or disdain, but fear of and debilitation by government
practices left them no other political alternatives. In the
end, the regimes found themselves isolated, without
the necessary domestic allies and resources to prevail.
The political-military consequences of these
insurgencies were profound. With the exception of
Nicaragua, the insurgencies devastated the political,
social, and economic institutions of their host countries.
In Vietnam, the unnecessary Viet Cong escalation to
guerilla war against the Diem regime in 1963 forced
the United States to intervene incrementally, changing
the nature and the spectrum of the conflict. In the end,
the Viet Cong were destroyed, forcing North Vietnam
to shoulder the main burden. In Algeria, by the time
Charles de Gaulle assumed the presidency of France in
1958, a return to the status quo ante was impossible due
to the power bloc of the French colonialists. Breaking
their power and putting the military back in its place
eclipsed defeating the insurgency. Only in Nicaragua

ix

did the revolutionary movement prosecute a swift coup
de main against Somoza’s regime. Isolating the regime
through defections of government allies and severed
relations from the United States and the international
community created the momentum needed to challenge
the regime in a short, violent campaign.
Recommendations.
U.S. National Security Strategy must take into
account the unique circumstances behind every
insurgency and be circumspect when considering the
level and type of involvement in a counterinsurgency.
The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely
anomalies because regime change preceded the
insurgency. The most likely national security scenario
will be the rendering of assistance to an established
government. Hence, political-military engagement
with dysfunctional governments should focus on the
following:
• Using the political context framework as a
reference, U.S. political and military advisors
must take every diplomatic opportunity with
their counterparts to underscore the deleterious
effects of dysfunctional governance and the
danger of inaction or half measures against
inchoate insurgencies.
• In preparation for their mission, advisors must
understand the demographics, social structures
and values, the real economic system, the political culture, and the structure and performance
of the political system. This preparation not
only helps the advisor understand the roots
of the insurgency and anticipate government
intransigence, but also provides awareness of
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counterproductive or inflammatory reforms.
• The U.S. Government must remain cognizant
of the substantive advantages an established
government has over insurgents and not rush to
intervene. The introduction of coalition ground
forces carries ramifications above the rendering
of security. The client government may relax
its counterinsurgency efforts, a burden the
coalition soon shoulders. With the immediate
threat abated, the government may see no need
to reform government practices, and the larger
the military contingent, the more difficult it is
to extract the political commitment without
the stigma of failure. Hence, a minimum
assistance package provides maximum political
flexibility.
• The centerpiece of any counterinsurgency
strategy is separating the insurgents from the
population. How that is accomplished is a matter
of strategy, but the historical record suggests
military operations targeting insurgents alone
are rarely successful. Allowing the establishment of local police and militia, either through
local authorities or coalition cadre trainers, is
the most effective way to establish security for
the population centers. Thereafter, construction
and development initiatives can begin in those
areas where security is established.
• Like security, construction and development
initiatives have the greatest effect at the local
level. Construction projects, which build what
the local townspeople want, use local labor, and
provide training and salaries, are the best way
to spur the local economy and to ensure the
people defend the completed projects.
• The establishment of a UN reconstruction
xi

and development coordination center could
serve to harmonize, coordinate, and monitor
construction and development projects among
the international organizations, nongovernment organizations, government organizations,
provincial reconstruction teams, and various
engineer units in country. A national coordination center serves as a clearing center for
legitimate organizations and prevents fraud,
conflicts, redundancies, and waste, which
inevitably result when separate organizations
are left on their own.
• The use of sophisticated information operations
to inform, persuade, and inspire the affected
population and rebut insurgent propaganda is
a prerequisite to counterinsurgency success. It
is not a wise idea, however, for a U.S. administration to target the American people, including
Congress, with information operations. It is
much better to give the domestic audience a
sober appraisal of the unfolding situation rather
than try to bolster confidence with exuberant
optimism. To do so risks creating a credibility
gap and possible backlash if a setback occurs.
Most experts agree that the War on Terror will last
for years. To meet this challenge without emptying
the national coffers and placing severe strains on
military readiness, the United States should adopt a
circumspect national security policy. States involved
in an insurgency rarely need military intervention on a
large scale. A bit of political-military finesse will serve
U.S. interests far more than viewing every insurgency
as a zero-sum game.
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THE POLITICAL CONTEXT BEHIND
SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS,
THREE CASE STUDIES:
VIETNAM (1955-63), ALGERIA (1945-62),
AND NICARAGUA (1967-79)
Introduction.
The challenge with writing about revolutionary
movements is that they are largely regarded as Cold
War or decolonization phenomena and hence largely
irrelevant today. With this in mind, winning the
hearts and minds of the population is not necessarily
an objective of the insurgents (as the current wars
with Islamic extremists adduce). Rhetoric aside,
revolutionary warfare is a struggle for political power
over some defined geographic area regardless of the
backdrop. Although technically a subset of insurgency
warfare, “revolutionary warfare” was often used
interchangeably during the Cold War, perhaps under
the belief that every struggle was somehow part of the
overarching communist wars of national liberation.
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that much of the
literature on insurgency warfare was hyperbolized
to alert Western leaders of the insidious threat to the
Third World. The most noteworthy hindsight is that
few Cold War revolutionary movements actually
conformed to Mao’s protracted war strategy.
Insurgent strategic approaches, as Bard O’Neill
explains in Insurgency and Terrorism, are influenced
by the physical and human environment, popular
support, organization and unity, external support,
and government response.1 Hence, the end of the Cold
War did not signal the end of revolutionary warfare,
as contemporary Islamic extremist organizations have
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demonstrated. Still, as O’Neill points out, even though
an insurgency can present a virulent threat to the
government, there is no guarantee the insurgents will
prevail. In fact, most fail.2 This fact can serve the United
States regarding counterinsurgency approaches to
client states beleaguered by revolutionary insurgents.
Understandably, the United States should remain
vigilant to extremist groups which prey on failed states
for a base of operations, but it should also consider the
tremendous advantages even weak states have over
insurgent threats. Foreknowledge of these advantages
can help the United States gauge the level and type
of assistance with confidence rather than indulge the
inclination for direct intervention.
This monograph examines how governments can
squander away their advantages vis-à-vis insurgents
using Jeff Goodwin’s framework for the political context behind revolutionary wars. Accordingly, it applies
this framework to three case studies—Vietnam (195563), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)—in
order to gain a greater appreciation of how government
pathologies, and not insurgent strategy, are the major
determinants of insurgent success.
Political Context Framework.
For a revolutionary movement to take root and
flourish, certain essential ingredients must exist,
creating what Jeff Goodwin calls the political context
behind a revolution. Goodwin defines political context
as the manner in which a country governs and regulates
its society, as well as the degree of political participation
it permits society.3 As a tool for analysis, Goodwin’s
state-centric approach provides a substantive and
compelling analytical framework for explaining the
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expansion of revolutionary movements. Furthermore,
this framework helps explain the revolutionary
movement’s reliance on violence over popular support
to gain political control.
Goodwin’s framework comprises five government
malpractices, which foster revolutionary movements:
(1) State sponsorship or protection of unpopular
economic and social arrangements or cultural
institutions; (2) Repression and/or exclusion of
mobilized groups from state power or resources; (3)
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political
figures; (4) Weak policing capacities and infrastructural
power; and (5) Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic
rule that alienates, weakens, or divides the elites of
society.4 Any of these practices alone is insufficient to
empower a revolutionary movement, but as Goodwin
argues, in aggregate, they are explosive. To paraphrase
Goodwin:
State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements or cultural institutions.
Revolutionary movements are more likely to form
whenever the population views the governing
leadership as intimately responsible for economic
and social injustices or protecting unjust cultural
institutions. Once this idea takes hold, the population
may perceive even subsequent government reforms as
a sign of weakness, further bolstering the revolutionary
movement. The existence of economic and social
inequities is not enough to alienate the people if they
believe other individuals or lower-level agencies are to
blame rather than the central government.5 Generally,
the majority of people will avoid joining or supporting
an insurgency (unless coerced) if they believe the
government is not connected to their plight, no matter
how severe it is.6
3

Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups from
state power or resources. Government exclusion of political and activist groups from the political process, especially through repression, serves to radicalize them to
such an extent that they eventually turn against the
regime. Repressive and exclusionary authoritarian
regimes are particularly susceptible to revolutionary
movements because they push even moderate
organizations into radical camps. Revolutionary
movements in turn radicalize new members by
marginalizing their moderate elements.7
The process of alienation is often gradual and,
in some cases, irreversable. People join insurgency
movements when they perceive the futility of
redressing grievances through political activity and
dissent. The government exacerbates alienation
when it uses “violent and indiscriminant” repression
against all groups—both radical and moderate. These
factors suffice to provide antigovernment groups the
opportunity to initiate open warfare.8
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures.
According to Goodwin, “Indiscriminate state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional figures is
likely to reinforce the plausibility, justifiability, and
(hence) diffusion of the idea that the state needs to
be violently ‘smashed’ and radically reorganized.”9
If government forces cannot extirpate the burgeoning
insurgency and begin to use indiscriminate violence
against the populace, insurgent recruitment is likely
to increase as the people seek protection through the
insurgents. Moreover, indiscriminate state violence
tends to undergird radical ideologies of state and
social revolution. In short, radical movements thrive
in this environment of intolerance, which causes the
evanescence of the moderates.10
4

Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power.
Anything less than overwhelming force will endanger
the regime’s capability to repress enemies of the state.
Insurgencies can grow unabated if the government
lacks the forces or the infrastructure to establish its
authority over insurgent enclaves. Remote regions on
the periphery of the state, especially with mountains
or jungles, often serve as superb insurgent sanctuaries.
Corrupt or politically compartmentalized government
and security forces undercut the ability to wage a
coherent counterinsurgency. Accordingly, insurgents
resort to open conflict and economic crises to accelerate
the fall of the regime.11
Goodwin’s assessment here is a bit narrow and
needs some refinement. Insurgency specialists John
J. McCuen, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier
assert that the primary task of the insurgency and
counterinsurgency is to gain control of the population
so as to garner its support.12 The amount and type of
force as well as the geographic conditions are merely
variables that shape the conflict. Galula elaborates on
the mechanisms of control in terms of the political
structure, the administrative bureaucracy, law enforcement, and the armed forces.13 This monograph will
highlight how deficiencies in these mechanisms result
in a loss of control over the population.
Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,
weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. Goodwin
believes that despotic and “neopatrimonial” dictatorships are particularly susceptible to revolutions
because they facilitate the formation and persistence
of revolutionary movements. Because dictators often
view economic and military elites as threats, they
continually seek to weaken and divide them. As a
result, the autocratic regime may lose its loyal base in
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times of revolutionary crisis by driving these elites into
the revolutionary camp.14
Neither Goodwin nor this monograph claims that
political context “is the only factor that explains the
formation and fate of revolutionary movements, but it
is generally the most important factor.”15 Nevertheless,
the reader may find the state-centric approach lacking
the essential flavor to complement the analysis. The
competence of the insurgent leadership most certainly
requires at least some examination if only to serve as a
contrast to the government’s competence.
The competence of the insurgent leadership to develop
and execute a successful strategy. Although a government
may create the conditions for the formation of
revolutionary movements, the insurgency can still
fail if the leadership is unable to conduct a successful
campaign. The primary task of the insurgency is
convincing the population that it is winning the conflict
and enjoys a wave of popular support. The political
effect dominates military considerations to such a
degree that insurgents must focus on propaganda to
gain the initiative. The insurgent propaganda campaign
seeks to isolate the government from the populace. It
also seeks to internationalize the conflict so insurgents
can garner external support as well as increasing
international criticism, diplomatic isolation, and even
economic sanctions on the government. Under these
conditions, military operations become increasingly
irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict.
Before addressing the crux of this monograph,
a small digression is necessary to avoid a basic
misunderstanding of a complex subject. The term
“revolutionary warfare” is misleading because it
implies an almost exclusive reliance on military force
to achieve political ends. Bernard Fall’s definition
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of revolutionary warfare as “guerrilla warfare plus
political action” furnishes a good conceptual definition.16 But to ensure there was no confusion regarding
the dominant ingredient, Fall added that “it is so important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but
a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and
that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent
and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make
up for the absence of a political rationale.”17 Truong
Chinh, former secretary general of the Vietnamese
Communist Party and former president of the North
Vietnamese legislature, drives home this very point:
[There are] those who have a tendency only to rely on
military action. . . . They tend to believe that everything
can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political
mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and
to convince people; . . . fighting spiritedly, they neglect
political work; they do not . . . act in such a way that
the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one
another.18

As this monograph will underscore, government
subordination of political effect to military expediency
is a frequent cause of counterinsurgency failure.
One critical aspect of revolutionary warfare is
the degree the conflict polarizes the combatants,
making compromise or even diplomacy extremely
difficult. Once a revolutionary insurgency reaches
a tipping point, as Bernard Fall noted, “it is difficult
to suppress with the help of military specialists
alone—particularly foreign specialists. And those antiinsurrectional systems that eventually prevailed over
the revolutionaries simply did so by accepting large
parts of the program advocated by the latter. . . .”19 As
each of the following cases suggest, failure to remain
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cognizant of the political nature of the conflict can
place severe strains on the government.
Republic of Vietnam, 1955-63.
State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. Contrary
to much of the literature on the origins of the Vietnam
War, the Viet Cong insurgency was not preordained
or even inevitable. Bernard Fall, the renowned expert
on the Indochina and Vietnam conflicts, observed that
revolutionaries cannot start an insurgency without
a basis because they will founder for lack of popular
support. Writing in 1966, Fall reflected that:
All Communist movements have a hard core of trained
military or guerilla cadres. Some of them may never
have a chance to use their military or organizational
skills; others do. It all depends on the local circumstances,
and rarely vice-versa. Such Communist cadres will exploit occasions when they arise, but they are incapable
of “creating” a revolution from scratch. It is Diem who
created the movement of discontent in South Vietnam.
North Vietnam and the Viet Cong fed on it.20

Indeed, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother
Ngo Dinh Nhu were the central figures in creating
the conditions for the vitalization of the Viet Minh
revolutionary movement, which formally became
the National Liberation Front (NLF) on December
20, 1960.21 Diem’s abrogation of the village-as-aninstitution created the grievances which the Viet Minh
cadres could exploit among the peasantry.
In June 1956, Diem annulled the local elections of
village chiefs and village councils, replacing them with
his own political appointees. While Diem probably
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took this step to extend his personal control over the
rural areas, few of these appointees were native to the
villages and preferred to live in the nearby district
towns.22 By personally appointing village officials, Diem
ended a 500-year tradition of local elections. Villagers
viewed these interlopers with animosity, particularly
since many of the appointees were corrupt.23 Frances
Fitzgerald abstracts the commonly held view among
villagers of Diem’s officials:
The government–appointed village chief; the “haughty,” “arrogant” official who took bribes from the local
landlords and forced the villagers to work for him; the
village security officer—a relative, perhaps of the district
chief—who used his position to take revenge on old enemies or to extort money from the villagers; the government soldiers who, like juvenile delinquents, drank too
much, stole food, and raped the village girls; the village
defense guards, who huddled in their earthwork forts
each night and fled when the Liberation Front came in
force to the village; [and] district and provincial officials
who, like Kafka’s bureaucrats, seemed to inhabit a world
impossibly remote from the village.24

Whenever the Viet Cong assassinated, kidnapped,
or drove out these officials, the villagers regarded the
Viet Cong as benefactors rather than terrorists.25 By
replacing the village officials with their own “elected”
cadre leaders, the NLF was able to subvert Diem’s
regime, village by village.26 One infers that villagers
likely did not accept the cadre leaders any more than
they did Diem’s appointees, but the NLF held the
monopoly of force once the government left a void.
Diem’s resettlement program proved disastrous
because it ignored the spiritual attachment peasants
held towards their villages. Moreover, inadequate
planning, poor settlement design, and inattention to
crop requirements created wretched conditions in the
9

new villages. Not surprisingly, at the first opportunity,
the inhabitants returned to their original homes.27
Fitzgerald noted that the peasant formed a fervent
attachment to the village, believing that abandonment
of it would result in the abandonment of the soul as
well. Hence, the village represented an integral part
of the peasant’s being.28 Under these circumstances,
the concept of resettlement would tend to alienate the
peasantry even if the new villages increased the quality
of life (which they did not).
Diem’s land reform program was equally mismanaged and not pursued seriously, alienating both
the landlords and tenants.29 Incidentally, the deluge
of American food imports and financial assistance to
the cities impoverished peasant rice farmers, but the
Americans did not consider the economic consequences
of their assistance at the micro-economic level.30 Nor did
they seem to consider the seriousness of an insurgency
generated at the grassroots level.
In 1962, the American and British advisors devised
the Strategic Hamlet program, which had proven
decisive in Malaya.31 But the program had some
inherent difficulties not present in Malaya. First, it
involved some resettlement in order to concentrate
the inhabitants in fortified villages. Unlike the squalid
settlements of the Chinese squatters in Malaya, the
new Vietnamese villages might not necessarily lead to
an improvement in living conditions, and the villagers
would have to walk farther to tend their fields. Second,
Nhu personally took charge of the program and
mismanaged it to ruin. He senselessly pursued a rapid,
haphazard construction program (trying to fortify twothirds of the 16,000 hamlets in just 14 months), which
resulted in a replay of the earlier, squalid resettlement
villages, and with less than 10 percent of the hamlets
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having any defensible capability.32 Had the government
followed the advice of Sir Robert Thompson (the
architect of the Malayan “new villages” program), the
planning, provision of resources, and execution of the
program would have been much more methodical
and organized. If Fitzgerald is correct, however, then
the issue of the peasant’s identity with the village
would have made the Strategic Hamlet program
very problematic as well. It could only be sold to the
peasantry as a temporary measure until the insurgency
was defeated. The government could have made it
clear to the peasants that they retained the choice of
staying or returning to their villages once hostilities
had ended.
In short, Diem alienated the peasantry by adopting
programs that ignored village institutions and culture.
Diem’s intractable stance permitted the Viet Minh
cadres to gain a footing in the villages because the
traditional local leadership was absent to garner village
resistance. More significantly, his policies led to the
loss of government control in the rural areas.
Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups
from state power or resources. Diem’s first act, with the
assistance of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief of
station Colonel Edward Lansdale, was to gain control
of the military by replacing General Nguyen Van Hinh,
the military chief of staff, after he challenged Diem’s
legitimacy. Next, Diem defeated in detail the three most
powerful sects in South Vietnam: the Hoa Hao, the Cao
Dai, and the Binh Xuyen. According to Bernard Fall,
the success of this campaign, in large measure, was
due to the popular support the Diem regime enjoyed
in ridding the country of these criminal and subversive
sects, and not to any tactical prowess of the military.33
Additionally, the 1955 Anti-Communist Denunciation
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Campaign successfully eliminated the Viet Minh
cadres as a threat to the regime.34 These victories were
a propitious start for Diem internationally. He had,
within a year of assuming power, secured the regime
from internal threats, paving the way for economic
reforms (almost totally through U.S. assistance) and
political reforms (or so the Americans had hoped).35
The defeat of the sects reassured the Eisenhower
administration and some influential senators that Diem
was the type of leader that would bolster America’s
containment strategy in South East Asia.36
Unfortunately, Diem did not temper his achievements with a subsequent policy of reconciliation. On the
contrary, his cleansing campaign turned increasingly
repressive, spreading to all sectors of society, with the
exception of the Catholics.37 In January 1956, Diem
issued Ordinance No. 6 which gave him carte blanche
against perceived national security threats, imposing
the arrest and detention of state enemies, establishing
concentration camps, suspending habeas corpus,
creating military tribunals without the right of defense
and appeal, and abolishing the right of assembly.38 The
concentration camps included not only communists,
but also members of various sects, political parties, the
media, and the trade unions.39
Repression, exclusion, and favoritism epitomized
the Diem regime. Diem and Nhu blatantly barred
opposition parties from the electoral process and
habitually suppressed newspapers critical of the
regime.40 The regime viewed all political groups, not
just the communists, as threats and suppressed them.41
Conversely, Catholics received favorable positions in
the administration, and Catholic villages received the
lion’s share of economic assistance and other aid.42
Within this political milieu, the Diem regime needlessly
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polarized the country into two camps, and Diem’s
camp grew smaller as his campaign of repression
became more expansive.
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures.
Diem’s campaign against all enemies, real or imagined,
was pervasive. Without a doubt, many Viet Minh were
arrested, but so were leaders of other political parties,
and even nationalists whose only crime was to have
earlier opposed the French. Other officials, without
Diem’s knowledge, used the anti-treason laws to
settle old scores with enemies, increase their economic
position, and gain a political advantage.43
The South Vietnamese army (ARVN) earned the
reputation of rapaciousness concerning its treatment
of villagers.44 As Bernard Fall recorded, American
advisors in Vietnam continually reproached the
ARVN for “stealing, raping, burning down villages,
[and] generally kicking people around.”45 Fitzgerald
believes this contempt from soldiers and government
officials created an atmosphere of paranoia among the
villagers to the extent “they ceased to trust each other
to the point where they could not organize to defend
themselves.”46 The crucial consequence of these acts
became manifest during the later counterinsurgency.
Conceptually, the villagers were the integral component
of the self-defense forces (local militias). If the regime
ill-treated the peasantry, then the peasants would not
fight for the regime.
The tipping point against the regime came in the
spring of 1963. The government’s use of deadly force
against Buddhist demonstrators in Hue on May 8
resulted in an unprecedented but powerful anti-Diem
opposition movement among the Vietnamese. Buddhist
activism—exemplified by mass protests, hunger
strikes, and several self-immolations—resonated
13

with the populace in a way the NLF could not.47
Committed openly to the overthrow of the regime, the
Buddhist sects acted through the media to demand
the end of Diem’s tyranny, using self-immolations as
a propaganda device more powerful than any NLF
terrorist act.48 In a show of solidarity, students from
Saigon and Hue staged protests.49 Uncompromisingly,
Nhu ordered the security forces on August 21 to
repress the Buddhists with a wave of executions and
arrests in Saigon, Hue, and other prominent cities.50
Thereafter, Nhu had thousands of college and high
school students arrested for protesting the August 21
atrocities. This last act appeared suicidal since it meant
the alienation of prominent families and the Catholic
clergy—virtually the last supporters of the regime. One
of Nhu’s subordinates believed his addiction to drugs
may have contributed to his irrational and paranoid
behavior, which eventually manifested in accusations
of a U.S. conspiracy against the Diem regime.51
For 8 years, the Diem regime had managed to push
a number of powerful sects and a sizable portion of
the peasantry into the arms of the Viet Minh cadres.
Furthermore, it had alienated the army, the Buddhists,
and the urban elites to such an extent that it lost its
source of support. Finally, the Kennedy administration
concluded that only regime change could salvage its
containment strategy in Southeast Asia.
Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power.
Diem’s haphazard and ineffective centralization of
the government resulted in several vacancies at the
provincial level, and in some parts of the country no
government presence existed.52 Wherever permanent
authority was absent, the government was sure to
lose control of the populace. Analyzing the meaning
of control during the Indochina conflict and the NLF
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insurgency in South Vietnam, Bernard Fall assessed
that using military occupation as a measurement of
control is illusory. The real indicators of control are
the number of villages paying taxes, the presence
of teachers in villages, and the political activities of
village chiefs and councils. A decline in tax collection,
an increase in teacher absenteeism in villages, and the
loss of village authority in fact indicate a government
loss of administrative control. By 1962, the insurgents
had killed upwards of 10,000 village chiefs out of 16,000
villages. By mid-1963, Communist tax collections were
prevalent in 42 out of 45 provinces. Fall concluded that
body counts and captured equipment are irrelevant in
insurgency warfare.53 “When a country is being subverted
it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered.”54
(Emphasis in the original.) Fall believed that the fallout
from government-appointed village chiefs resulted in
the severance of 80 percent of the population from the
central government.55
As early as 1955, the United States had taken an
active role in Vietnam’s security. It reorganized the
ARVN into seven divisions equipped with American
weapons and equipment. As the insurgency grew,
the United States created the Popular Forces to patrol
villages and Regional Forces (50,000 total) to provide
provincial defense. In short, it had created an Americanstyle military bureaucracy and organization.56 By 1963,
the United States deployed 16,000 American advisors
for the ARVN.57 The 300,000-man ARVN may have
dominated geographic terrain most of the time, but
this fact was irrelevant because the NLF dominated
most of the population centers. This terrain is where
insurgencies are won.58
Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,
weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. In
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many ways, Diem was a cipher, an embodiment of
contradictions. He was personally an ascetic, but his
regime was extremely corrupt. Appointed by Emperor
Bao Dai as the premier for South Vietnam during the
summer of 1954, Diem had tenuous political support
to draw from initially. Vietnamese military and civil
authorities regarded him as an interloper since he had
not lived in Vietnam for the previous 4 years, and the
Cochin Chinese landlords distrusted him because he
was Catholic and from central Vietnam. Fortunately
for Diem’s political future, Colonel Lansdale convinced
the Eisenhower administration to support him as a
matter of foreign policy, which in turn convinced
Diem’s rivals not to challenge him.59 Diem’s antiJapanese and anti-communist credentials, as well as his
reputation for integrity and executive skills, certainly
bolstered his international standing.60 Diem’s defeat
of the most powerful sects convinced the Eisenhower
administration that Diem had the moxie to resist the
communist threat, and it thereafter proceeded to
provide substantial financial, military, and advisory
support.61
Despite these credentials, Diem was not the
champion of democratic institutions as supposed. Evidence suggests he saw himself literally as a Confucian
emperor, who ruled as a paternal and moral sovereign.
As such, only he could determine what was best for
the people, and hence regarded voting and elections
as a means to establish the unanimity of his decisions.
To Diem, permitting the uninformed and uneducated
masses to have a voice in important political
matters would be an abrogation of his sovereign
responsibilities.62 In view of his political outlook, Diem’s
excessive voter fraud in the presidential and legislative
elections of 1957, 1961, and 1963 is understandable; it
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was designed to ordain his reign and install officials
who would prosecute his edicts.63
Without a doubt, the catalyst for the Viet Minh
revolutionary movement was Diem’s obsession for
centralized control, even though he lacked the requisite
organizational and managerial skills to ensure it. Fall
claims that until Diem began alienating the populace,
the 6000-strong Viet Minh cadre in South Vietnam
commanded no popular support.64 The survivors of
the Hoa-Hao, Cao-Dai, and the Binh Xuyen sects threw
their support behind the Viet Minh almost immediately
due to Diem’s relentless persecution.65 If properly
cultivated, these sects could have been valuable allies
in combating the Viet Minh cadres, since they had no
particular affinity with the communists.
Although Diem inherited a functional administration from the French, he failed to pursue judicial, economic, and administrative reforms, empower subordinates to exercise government authority, or create a system of oversight to curb corruption.66 Consequently,
corruption abounded in all forms. In spite of Diem’s
personal revulsion of corruption, the Ngo family was
the biggest practitioner of nepotism. His close relatives
filled the top ambassadorial, cabinet, and civil service
posts. Most significant, his brother Nhu served as
his personal advisor and chief of central intelligence,
making him the most powerful man in Vietnam.67
Cracks in the regime appeared frequently, which
must have emboldened the NLF and North Vietnamese,
while at the same time alarming the Americans. In
1960, the Groupe Caravelliste, comprising 18 senior
Vietnamese politicians, publicly condemned regime
oppression and corruption in detail. Weeks later, a
poorly planned military coup provided the regime with
the opportunity to crack down even more, including
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the imprisonment of the Groupe Caravelliste.68 At this
point, Diem began to withdraw into himself, reducing
his circle of confidants, and isolating himself even
further from the public view.69 Nhu began to step up his
persecution of “subversives,” as well as factionalizing
the officer corps through corruption, extortion, and
espionage. This environment not only created a climate
of mistrust in the officer corps (making the formulation
of a coup problematic), but it also undermined military
prosecution of an effective counterinsurgency.70
The spontaneous demonstrations in the late spring
and summer of 1963 finally alerted the United States
of the rot within the Diem regime. In August 1963,
the Kennedy administration quietly hinted to the top
ARVN generals that a change in government might
be in order. Further dissociation of the Diem regime
by the Kennedy administration in October convinced
the paranoid generals that they could count on U.S.
acquiescence if a coup occurred. So it was on November
1 that the general’s coup toppled the regime, resulting
in the execution of Diem and Nhu without fanfare.71
The competence of the insurgent leadership to develop
and execute a successful strategy. In the aftermath of the
French Indochina War, the Viet Minh cadre in South
Vietnam reverted to a political struggle in anticipation
of forming a new government in the aftermath of the
proposed 1956 national elections. As a hedge, the cadre
would maintain its revolutionary organization in case
the elections were not held.72 Even though the Viet Minh
cadre depended on North Vietnam for resources and
strategic guidance, it would be an overstatement to say
it was a mere appendage of North Vietnam.73 Often the
agendas of each clashed with major debates regarding
whether the cadre should start the military struggle
as its leadership desired, or continue with political
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subversion as the northern leadership desired.74 The
goal of unification was never in question; rather the
dispute revolved around the strategy. But the main
point is that the North Vietnamese government did not
have such control over the cadres that it could direct
all of their activities. The relationship was much looser
than that.
In 1957, the Viet Minh cadre began a two-pronged
campaign to sever the government’s control from the
rural population. One prong focused on propaganda
while the other involved “a campaign of assassinations
aimed at government officials, teachers, and members
of the Cong An (the Diemist secret police) in an effort to
eliminate government institutions in the countryside.75
Although North Vietnam was predominantly engaged
in consolidating its domestic economic and political
position, Ho Chi Minh increasingly viewed the cadres’
struggle favorably, appointing the principal cadre
leaders, Le Duan and Pham Hung, to substantive
leadership positions in the Communist party, as well
as having them accompany him to Moscow in order
to lobby for Soviet aid and diplomatic support of
their revolutionary struggle.76 By the end of 1958, the
revolutionary movement (now called the Viet Cong)
had begun to recover from Diem’s Anti-Communist
Denunciation Campaign, and Le Duan began lobbying
North Vietnam to support the Viet Cong’s escalation
to an armed struggle, a decision North Vietnam’s
leadership declined to make at this juncture.77 North
Vietnam favored a continuation of the subversion
campaign, fearing an armed struggle would lead to
the intervention of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
and increase the probability of American military
intervention.78 Increased involvement would need to
wait until North Vietnam finished the consolidation
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of its socialist programs and the reorganization and
modernization of the NVA in accordance with its
5-year plan (1955-59).79
The last half of 1959 became the defining period for
the insurgency. Diem’s unrelenting counterinsurgency
campaign against the Viet Cong (and everyone else)
pressured the North Vietnamese leadership to agree
to some intensification of the campaign into an armed
struggle.80 During this period, North Vietnam began
reorganizing and rearming the cadre units, as well
as revitalizing former base areas in South Vietnam.
In January 1960, the Viet Cong armed struggle began
with a series of attacks on the ARVN and government
officials in villages.81 In December 1960, the cadre
formed the National Liberation of South Vietnam
(NLFSV or NLF) to provide a political identity for the
struggle and for international assistance.82
Still, the debate raged within the Vietnamese
Communist party (Lao Dong) between advocates of
an armed struggle and those in favor of continuing
the political struggle. Powerful party members
Truong Chinh and General Vo Nguyen Giap urged
caution, believing that active resistance and continual
expansion of the movement would ultimately achieve
the overthrow of Diem’s regime without risking
increased American involvement.83 In the end, the Viet
Cong leadership swayed the majority for an escalation
to guerrilla warfare. As Giap had feared, the American
military assistance and intervention increased in kind,
eventually escalating the conflict beyond what the
North Vietnamese had planned.84
Objectively, the opponents of an accelerated
timetable for armed conflict were probably correct.
Despite years of Diem’s cleansing operations, the Viet
Cong still numbered 5,000 members in the 1958-59
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time frame. Admittedly, a substantial percentage of
cadre leadership positions had been eliminated in the
conflict, but so long as the Viet Cong infrastructure
remained in place, losses alone were not decisive.85
The cadre’s strategy of political struggle was
essentially sound, effective, and adaptive. The NLF
discovered that the peasants did not automatically
transfer allegiance with the elimination of the village
chiefs or landlords. Rather, they remained reserved,
not wanting to get involved in a conflict between
“outsiders.” Interestingly, the NLF land reform
program did benefit the peasants, and the affected
peasants were appreciative but not enough to throw
their support behind the NLF.86 Fitzgerald proposes
that the greatest factor in gaining the support of the
peasantry was an enduring NLF presence in the
villages and treating the villagers with politeness
and kindness. In contrast to the abhorrent behavior
of the ARVN, the NLF presence may have been more
tolerable. Fitzgerald concludes that the Government
of Vietnam (GVN) “did not care for them [villagers].
The GVN wanted not to win them over, but merely
to rule them.”87 Reinforcing the rapport between the
cadre cells and the peasants, the NLF emphasized its
policy of respecting the centrality of the village with
the peasantry.88
The well-documented history of Viet Cong
terrorism, murder, intimidation, and atrocities against
the population contradicts Fitzgerald’s harmony of
mutual affections between the NLF and peasant. Viet
Cong subversion depended on coercion. As the Viet
Minh had demonstrated during the Indochina War, only
through the establishment of a permanent presence in
each village could the NLF gain control of the peasantry.
The cadres lived among the villagers and depended on
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them for sustenance, security, and intelligence. They
also meted out punishment and rewards as a means of
establishing their authority. By recruiting among the
villagers, fortifying the village, and creating weapons
and food caches, the politico-military cadres drew the
peasants into the conflict. The ARVN only ran patrols
through villages and never established a permanent
presence. If the ARVN launched an operation against
a known/suspected Viet Cong-controlled village, it
was the villagers who suffered from the attack. The
Viet Cong calculated the villagers would channel their
anger towards the government rather than the NLF.89
Nevertheless, these attitudes, if they truly existed,
seemed to have changed once the American military
became engaged, with villagers lambasting the Viet
Cong for bringing the wrath of America firepower
down upon them.
Using each controlled village as a base, the NLF
devised the “growth and split” technique for expanding
its control. The cadre would form a military unit (e.g.,
a platoon) from the local villages, train it, and give
it experience through combat. Later, the surviving
members would split into three cadres to serve as
the basis for three new platoons, and so forth.90 This
technique tended to churn out competent units
relatively quickly, especially when one considers that
the evolving cadre consisted of survivors, who could
pass their proven skills to new recruits. In this manner,
the NLF grew to 15,000 insurgents by 1961.91
This approach not only enhanced the movement’s
growth, it also demonstrated the dominant position
political subversion plays in revolutionary warfare.
The government can win hundreds, even thousands,
of military engagements, but if it loses control and
the support of the people in the process, it will lose
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its source of recruitment, labor, fiscal support (taxes),
and ultimately perceived legitimacy as the sovereign.
As Thomas Hobbes observed, self-preservation is the
primary motivation of the individual caught in an
insurgency, so he will support whichever side can
provide him that security.92 It is not surprising, then,
that through its political-military organization, the
NLF was able to extend its control of 80 percent of the
rural population by 1963.93 Bernard Fall’s assessment
appears valid: The Viet Cong did not outfight the Diem
regime, it out-administered it. But the critical lesson is
that the Viet Cong movement would not have reached
critical mass had the Diem regime not pursued such
self-defeating practices.
On the other hand, the Viet Cong leadership made
the strategic error of escalating the struggle into armed
conflict and in such an unrestrained manner that the
United States was compelled to intervene, changing
the complexion of the conflict. As insurgency expert
John J. McCuen concluded, the Viet Cong leadership
overreached, causing its own demise:
This massive U.S. intervention and the new South Vietnamese Government which followed Diem successfully
reorganized the pacification program and radically
changed the military and political strategies to reestablish the control, security, and support of the South Vietnamese population. This success was culminated during
the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, when not only
the offensive was bloodily repulsed, but almost all of the
remaining Viet Cong cadres who surfaced, expecting a
general uprising of the population, were either killed or
arrested. The North Vietnamese tried unsuccessfully to
replace these Viet Cong cadres with North Vietnamese,
but the population would not accept them. In any event,
the Viet Cong were never again a significant force during the war . . . [primarily due to] the U.S. and South
Vietnamese pacification program and the military/po-
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litical strategies in the field, which did reestablish the
control, security, and support of the population. This is
in itself a key lesson.94

In short, the Diem regime created the conditions
which fed the NLF movement. The fact that the NLF
overreached suggests the leadership lacked strategic
patience. In the end, the NLF brought in the United
States, which possessed the power to destroy the
NLF—and it did.
Algeria, 1945-62.
State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. Although
Algeria had been a French province since 1870,
affording it ideally all the privileges and obligations
of metropolitan France, the Algerian people did not
enjoy the same status as Frenchmen, especially under
the European colonists (pied noir or colons) in Algeria.
So many bureaucratic obstacles existed for Algerians
seeking citizenship that official policies of assimilation
became absurd notions.95 Throughout their tenancy in
Algeria, the pied noir (particularly the arch conservative
ultras) consistently thwarted any government reforms
or reciprocation of Algerian wartime service.96
In Alistair Horne’s view, paltry Algerian representation in the local government, an unjust social
system (commune mixtes), and discriminatory political
policies were always at the heart of Algerian discontent.
Racism, the unequal distribution of wealth (especially
arable land), and economic hardships, as well as
poor vocational training and education, exacerbated
grievances. Since its occupation of Algeria in 1830,
France had treated Algerian nationalism with imperial
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contempt and arrogance. Even basic respect for the
average Algerian was callously disregarded. Pied noir
voter fraud in the Algerian Assembly elections in 1948
convinced a small number of Algerian conspirators
that independence through violence was the only
recourse.97
Still, a revolutionary movement may not have
emerged had World War II and the Indochina War
not occurred. The German defeat of France in 1940
damaged French prestige and baraka (honored position)
among Algerians. The Viet Minh defeat of the French
at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 broke the aura of French
invincibility.98 Horne laments that despite all this,
the tragedy of the Algerian insurgency might have
been averted had the French shown “a little more
magnanimity, [and] a little more trust, moderation and
compassion. . . .”99
Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups from
state power or resources. In contrast to the British colonial
practice, the French excluded all but a handful of Algerians from administrative posts. The paltry number
of French administrators, overworked and understaffed, had little contact with the populace. Frequently,
they relied on Muslim intermediaries, the vast majority
of whom were corrupt and hated by the inhabitants.100
Imperceptibly, resistance movements emerged in the
1930s, cloaked in nationalism, but following distinct
approaches. The deeply influential Ulema religious
movement of Ben Badis sought a return to Islamic
principles. The Étoile Nord-Africaine (forerunner to
the MTLD)101 revolutionary movement of Messali
Hadj sought the redistribution of property among the
Algerian people. Finally, the liberal movement of Ferhat
Abbas initially embraced assimilation with France
but on terms of equality. The Ulema and Étoile leaders
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were inveterate firebrands, calling for the expulsion
of the Europeans from Algeria. The liberal movement
reluctantly moved towards that position in 1936 when
pied noir lobbies defeated the Blum-Viollette Bill which
sought assimilation of Algerians as bona fide French
citizens. The collapse of the bill not only marginalized
Algerian moderates, but it also convinced the pied noir
that they were the ultimate arbiters of French policy in
Algeria.102 The French authorities exacerbated tensions
by arresting Messali and Abbas during World War II
for publishing nationalist tracts. Thereafter, Algerian
nationalists regarded French promises of reforms
as platitudes, particularly if the pied noir remained a
political force.103
The first real shots of the insurgency rang out on
May 8, 1945, when an Algerian pro-independence
demonstration took place in Sétif during the “Victory
over Europe” (V.E.) Day celebrations. Violence brokeout and rapidly spread to the surrounding areas, resulting in the massacre of 103 Europeans, the wounding of
100, and the raping of several women. Many corpses
were intentionally mutilated. In traditional fashion,
the French garrisons responded with the ratissage—
the indiscriminate raking over of villages—to pacify
the affected areas. Estimates of Algerian dead ranged
from 1,300 to 50,000, depending on French or Algerian
accounts. The uprising struck fear into the European
pied noir, who not only supported the brutal methods
of the French authorities but also used the uprising to
filibuster for reforms. As an illustration of unintended
effects, many Algerians were more repulsed than
intimidated by the military reprisals and hardened
their resolve for eventual liberation from the French
order.104
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After Sétif, Messali was exiled to French Congo,
and Abbas again arrested. Predictably, Abbas became
estranged from Messali for his role in the Sétif
massacres, and upon release pursued his moderate
course once more as a member of the Algerian
Assembly. Unknown to the French government,
Sétif only brought a respite, not preemption of the
insurgency. Worse, it gave the pied noir a sense of
arrogant complacency. As mentioned, their arrogance
was best exemplified by the blatant voting fraud during
the 1948 Algerian Assembly elections in which the pied
noir and their coterie retained their majority.105 Writing
on the repercussions of the election, French professor
Charles-André Juilen warned in 1953, “It is by closing
the normal paths of legality to a mass of eight million
people that one risks driving it back into the arms of the
declared adversaries of la présence française, who aim
to solve the Algerian problem by violence.”106 In short,
while French insouciance towards the Algerian people
created tensions, pied noir political intrigue accounted
for the virulence of the insurgency when it erupted on
November 1, 1954.
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures.
In response to the inequities under French rule, the
chicanery of the pied noir, and weakened position of
France following the Indochina War, the founders of the
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) determined in July
1954 that the time was ripe for a popular uprising.107
Starting off with no more than 400 miscellaneous
small arms, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN,
the military component of the FLN) launched its
“massive” uprising on November 1, 1954.108 Small
groups of insurgents conducted 70 attacks, all of which
miscarried, resulting in few captured arms and little
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damage.109 Militarily, the operation was a complete
failure. Worse, the expected popular uprising also
failed to materialize.110 In fact, the French authorities
initially thought it was just another “tribal uprising”
since most of the attacks were confined to the remote
Aurès mountain region (Wilaya 1 or Administrative
Zone 1).111 Unfortunately for the French government,
ALN military ineptitude belied the superb FLN
political groundwork that created formidable enclaves
in the Aurès and Kabylias (Wilaya 3) regions.
This misreading of the situation helps explain the
French incremental, expedient, and short-sighted
response. But pied noir political pressure on the French
government also played a major part in the conflict,
and its political power in all matters concerning
Algeria cannot be overstated.112 Its political clout
was such that it determined the rise and demise of
several metropolitan French governments during the
war. Hence, there was tremendous political pressure
within the government to appease pied noir interests to
the detriment of the Algerians—even if this meant an
escalation of the insurgency.113
Governor General Roger Léonard did not appreciate
the gravity of the threat unfolding in the first weeks
of the conflict. France had just 3,500 combat troops in
Algeria, but the governor general requested only the
deployment of the 25th Airborne Division to deal with
the problem—a force much too small for the threat.114
However, even as troop strengths increased from
80,000 in January 1955, to 120,000 in August 1955, and
to 200,000 in December 1955, the authorities (incited
by the ultras) continued to respond with inappropriate
methods to the insurgent threat.115 FLN provocations
and atrocities were met with French repression, mass
arrests, false imprisonment, collective punishments,
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torture, atrocities, and other pernicious acts associated
with ratissages that drove ordinary Algerians into the
FLN ranks.116 The over-reaction was symptomatic
of the schizophrenia infecting the various French
governments. Domestically, they wanted to appear
strong against the insurgents, yet repeatedly forbad any
military action that might result in collateral damage.
Regardless, the governing authorities in Algeria either
ignored the official rules of engagement or failed to
implement them in a timely manner. Meanwhile, pied
noir paramilitary squads created their own reign of
terror.117
Inexplicably, the FLN never tried to compete for
the hearts and minds of the Algerians. Insurgents used
racketeering to obtain funds and food and terrorist
acts to intimidate the inhabitants into silence. Jacques
Soustelle, the governor general in 1955, observed that
the FLN “never sought to attach the rural populations
to their cause by promising them a better life, a happier
and freer future; no, it was through terror threat they
submitted them to their tyranny.”118 Of FLN victims,
86 percent were fellow Muslims during the first 2
1/2 years of the conflict. Part of an FLN recruit’s final
initiation was to assassinate a government officer or
informant in order to solidify his status as a committed
FLN insurgent. Mutilation of French loyalists was
part of the ritual so as to belittle the victim, but also
to set an example for others. Muslim moderates
were singled out for immediate elimination because
the FLN did not want any moderate interlocutors
available for the French to negotiate the peace (a
prominent exception was Abbas, who joined the FLN
in 1956 out of exasperation with the French).119 Lastly,
attacks on Europeans were designed to sever contact
with the Muslims.120 Ironically, the French were partly
responsible for turning the population into veritable
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hostages because they had disarmed them out of fear
of weapons falling into insurgent hands.
The insurgency appeared to be waning until the
summer of 1955, when the FLN in the Constantine
region (Wilaya 2), after suffering tremendous losses and
outraged by French ratissages and policies of “collective
responsibility,” raised the level of the conflict by
committing atrocities against European civilians and
the French military. On August 20, the FLN attacked
26 localities around Philippeville, committing such
horrible mutilations on men, women, and children that
the massacre left a lasting imprint on the subsequent
course of the war. The French military and pied noir
reprisals were immediate, indiscriminate, and bloody.
At this point, the war changed character. The French
government placed the crushing of the rebels above
any compromise or negotiations, and now considered
the conflict as total war.121 Most significant, the French
government ceded its political authority to the military
leadership in Algeria to end the insurgency by any
means.122 This weakening of political direction and
constraints on military strategy virtually undercut any
political settlement of the insurgency—short of the
complete subjugation of the Algerians. In this context,
the pro-Algerian reform initiatives of Governor General
Jacques Soustelle and later Robert Lacoste remained
moribund as long as the ultras retained their dominant
political position in Algerian matters.123 Lastly, any
“hearts and minds” benefits accrued by Soustelle’s
civic action teams (Sections Administratives Specialisées)
were offset by the ratissages, collective responsibility,
and inhabitant relocation policies.124
Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power. In
view of the troubles elsewhere in the French empire
(i.e., Indochina and Madagascar), the initial paltry
number of French troops and policemen available to
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handle a major insurgency was unavoidable. Moreover,
the FLN started out with a tremendous advantage
because it was able to create formidable enclaves in the
mountainous regions. The extreme terrain and climate
were daunting, but the French military performed well
under the circumstances. Because the mountainous
tracks were too poor for mechanized vehicles, the task of
rooting out the guerrillas fell on the light infantrymen.
The harsh climate, unforgiving terrain, and constant
danger of ambush created experienced and hardened
units. This not only applied to the elite paratroopers
and foreign legionnaires but also to the conscripts that
later flowed into theater.125
The Philippeville massacres in August 1955
prompted Mollet’s government to use conscripts to
provide the military with sufficient strength to crush
the insurgency. Troop levels jumped from 200,000
to 402,000 by August 1956, in addition to 180,000
Algerian auxiliaries.126 By comparison, FLN guerrillas
numbered between 15,000 and 20,000.127 Unfortunately
for the French effort, the conscripts suffered inordinate
casualties until they became battle savvy, and hence
the French public became acutely aware of the war
in Algeria.128 On the plus side, the French adoption
of the very effective quadrillage system enabled the
French forces to clear areas of insurgents meticulously,
consequently inflicting 13,899 casualties on the FLN
from April 1 to December 1956.129 This might have
proven decisive had the French not withdrawn
forces in October for the Suez War in November, the
failure of which greatly deflated French morale while
simultaneously bolstering FLN morale.130
The FLN decided the time was ripe for gaining
international attention by announcing a national strike
centered in Algiers for January 28, 1957.131 Since the
summer of 1956, the FLN had been conducting a series
31

of bombings and shootings in Algiers in retaliation for
the execution of two FLN insurgents in June.132 The
French struck back with a vengeance. The military
reaction might not have been so extreme had recent
events not sent them over the edge. The humiliation
of Indochina was still fresh, and many of the officers
and paratroopers sent in to establish order in Algiers
were veterans of Indochina, specifically Dien Bien Phu.
Now smarting from the Suez debacle, the paratroopers
were in no mood for intellectualizing over the nuances
and contradictions of urban insurgencies. Worse, and
probably the most incendiary, the pied noir decried the
new commander-in-chief of Algeria, General Raoul
Salan. Associating him with the defeat in Indochina, the
pied noir accused Salan of wanting to sell out Algeria as
well. To make their stance absolutely clear, the pied noir
attempted to assassinate Salan with a bazooka attack on
his office. This act seemed to spur Salan and his senior
subordinate, General Jacques Massu, into crushing the
insurgency completely as a means of appeasing the
pied noir.133 From February through October 1957, a
combination of intelligence, much of it gained through
torture, and relentless military and police actions
broke the back of the FLN in Algiers and continued
throughout Algeria until the core FLN leadership was
driven into FLN-friendly Morocco and Tunisia.134 To
prevent FLN infiltrations back into Algeria, the French
completed the Morice Line along the Tunisian border in
September 1957, a 200-mile electrified fence augmented
by minefields and electronic sensors.135 Manning the
Morice Line, 80,000 French troops successfully insulated Algeria from insurgent infiltrations.136 Next, the
French interior forces focused their efforts on eradicating the remaining FLN units and politico-military
cells.
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When Charles de Gaulle assumed power in June
1958, France was no closer to a political settlement in
Algeria than before. Despite the tremendous initial
support from the pied noir and the military for de
Gaulle, he appears rightfully to have regarded both
as part of the problem rather than the solution to the
Algerian insurgency. His initial focus was on domestic
concerns in France, particularly the new constitution.
Hence, he empowered the new commander-in-chief of
Algeria, General Maurice Challe, to launch a conclusive
campaign on the FLN so as to create the conditions for
a political settlement, in which France would retain
de facto authority over Algeria.137 Challe conducted a
series of offensives to crush the ALN, reducing their
operative numbers from 30,000 in 1958 to 15,000 by
the end of 1959. Moreover, FLN sanctuaries were now
confined to the Aurès region.138
Satisfied with these results, de Gaulle offered the
Algerians an opportunity to achieve self-determination
with the implication that he expected a moderate
government with close ties to France.139 What he
did not expect, but should have, was a revolt by the
pied noir in Algiers (Barricades Week, January 1960)
and by some senior military officers. Even General
Challe turned on de Gaulle, perceiving the offer of
self-determination as a betrayal of the military’s
sacrifices.140 In turn, De Gaulle asserted his authority
over the military and the pied noir, removing several
leaders from both camps. In April 1960, General Crépin
replaced Challe and resumed military operations
against the FLN in the Aurès region, but with the clear
understanding that a political settlement was integral
to the counterinsurgency strategy.141
By the end of 1960, the FLN was reduced to around
8,000 insurgents, operating in small, ineffective bands,
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isolated from the population and from the FLN
leadership abroad; most of their 6,500 weapons had
to be buried for lack of ammunition. Internal FLN
purges and combat with French forces had devastated
the FLN leadership, and some leaders had even
begun to surrender.142 Nevertheless, de Gaulle spent
the remaining 2 years of the conflict trying to police
the pied noir and the military mavericks, all the while
finishing off the FLN and finding a moderate political
entity to form an Algerian government.143 Not only did
this infighting detract from fighting the insurgents, it
also gave hope to the FLN to hold out until de Gaulle
negotiated terms more favorable to and only with the
FLN.
Consequently, the FLN’s ability simply to survive
contributed more to its success than any other factor.
Pied noir political intrigue plagued every French
government, severely complicating the effective
prosecution of the counterinsurgency. Hence, the
French government was unable to translate military
successes into the desired political settlement.
Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,
weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. The pied
noir (especially the hard-line ultras) bear the lion’s
share of the blame for fomenting the FLN revolutionary
movement and ultimately contributing to its success.
Since 1870, they had dominated French policy in Algeria
and maintained a stranglehold on its legislation.144
Arguably, the average Algerian regarded them as the
embodiment of French rule in Algeria. The pied noir
regarded Algerians as an inferior race and thought
of them, when conscious of them at all, as merely a
source of cheap labor. As a political bloc, the pied noir
filibustered reforms for assimilation and equality—up
to the very end of the war. More than any other factor,
the pied noir entangled the French military in political
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affairs, which eventually led to the Organisation Armée
Secrète (OAS) coup against President de Gaulle.145
Clearly, the rapid succession of seven French
governments during the war contributed to the political
prominence of the pied noir.146 Moreover, the frequent
shuffling of government officials undercut a coherent
and consistent policy towards Algeria. The French
army in Algeria increasingly filled the policy void
incrementally and found itself totally politicized by
the conflict. The pied noir actively opposed government
programs and co-opted the army into supporting their
cause. In contrast to the pied noir, however, the military
ardently pursued programs of assimilation and reforms
among the Algerian populace, but it became zealous
in part because the French government abrogated its
political authority regarding the prosecution of the
war and in part because the military saw Algeria as
the means to redeem France’s honor and to stem
the empire’s decline.147 Alongside the pied noir, the
army in Algeria actively sought the promotion of de
Gaulle to power, expecting he would provide the
political impetus for final victory (even though each
held a different definition of victory). When de Gaulle
decided to offer Algeria self-determination, the pied
noir and powerful military leaders revolted with some
(i.e., the OAS) engaging in a campaign of domestic
terrorism and an attempted coup d’état.148 Hence,
the autocratic and corrupt grip on power by the pied
noir caused severe rifts between themselves and the
French government, between themselves and the
Algerian people, and between the army in Algeria and
the French government. Only a leader of de Gaulle’s
stature could have broken the political stranglehold of
the pied noir and their military accomplices. As much
as he probably deplored the idea, de Gaulle had no
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choice but to negotiate an end to the insurgency with
the FLN. With everyone alienated and no moderate
individuals or groups available for negotiation, only
the FLN was in a position to form a government.149
The competence of the insurgent leadership to develop
and execute a successful strategy. Of the nine original
FLN leaders (the neuf historiques), many had fought as
French soldiers in World War II.150 For example, Ben
Bella, the principal founder of the FLN and later the
first president of Algeria, fought for France in 1940
and later in Italy with the Free French. For his heroism,
he was awarded the Croix de Guerre, and General de
Gaulle had personally pinned on his Médaille Militaire.
Similarly, Ben Boulaid was a highly decorated warrant
officer from the Italian campaign (1943-45). The notorious Belkacem Krim had also served in the military
but upon discharge had become a political activist and
then full-fledged guerrilla in 1947. Krim’s lieutenant,
Omar Ouamrane, also served in the army before
becoming a guerrilla.151 The point is that although they
were familiar with Mao Tse-tung’s works on guerrilla
warfare, they were not formally trained as communist
revolutionaries, but rather as French soldiers who
understood intimately the strengths and weaknesses
of the French military.
Because the FLN represented an amalgam of differing ethnic groups and ideologies, the organization
opted for a collective leadership. The inability for the
FLN to choose a prominent leader for the struggle was
both a weakness and strength.152 Without a leader of
stature to reconcile differences and conflicts within
the FLN, internecine struggles inevitably emerged.153
Additionally, French diplomatic efforts remained
problematic without an FLN central authority (until
1959), particularly after the French had successfully
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scattered the FLN collective leadership into various
countries. The primary strength of relying on a
leadership committee was that it was much more
difficult for the French to isolate and destroy the FLN
leadership.154 The neuf historiques divided command
responsibility as follows:
CRUA* Interior
Wilaya I		
Wilaya II		
Wilaya III
Wilaya IV
		
Wilaya V		
		
Wilaya VI
		

Aures Mountains		
North Constantine		
Kabylia			
Algiers and surrounding
areas
Oran and the western
areas
Desert region south		
of Atlas Mountains

Ben Boulaid
Mohamed Didouche
Belacem Krim
Rabah Bitat
Ben M’hidi
No assignment

CRUA Exterior
Paris		
Cairo		
		

Mohamed Boudiaf
Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed,
Mohamed Khider155

*Comité Révoltutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action, the operational headquarters for
the FLN.

Operationally, the FLN adopted a triangular
organization of cells for the subversion of French
authority.156 The cellular approach permitted the FLN
to generate and regenerate new cells rapidly and
presented no organizational center of gravity for the
French military to attack. As early as 1951, Belkacem
Krim had experimented with this clandestine politicaladministrative system to gain control of 2,000 villages
in Wilaya III, and this infrastructure served as the
FLN model for revolutionary warfare.157 Like the Viet
Minh cadres, a lightly armed cell would move into a
village; establish its authority by intimidation and
terrorist acts; and then use the village for tax collection,
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recruitment, and maintaining administrative control of
the population.158 The revolutionary groundwork was
so well set that once hostilities broke out on November
1, 1954, the ALN was able to expand from 400 to 2,000
insurgents within 6 days in the Aurès region alone,
turning it into a fortified enclave.159 In the following
weeks, FLN infestation became prolific throughout
Algeria.
For the FLN, the primary step in controlling the local
populace was isolating it from government authority.
Any resistance from the inhabitants was met with
immediate execution so as to intimidate the rest. Above
all, school teachers were singled out for expulsion.
Lastly, the insurgent cell would burn all identification
cards and civil records in order to complicate French
efforts for regaining administrative control. Whenever
the police or the military came through a village on
patrol, it was met with silence, reflecting the plight
of the villagers. As in Indochina and later South
Vietnam, the presence of government security forces
was only momentary, while the insurgent presence
was permanent. Any cooperation with the French
would result in quick insurgent retaliation.160 That the
FLN was able to survive the first winter despite French
efforts was likely the greatest boon to recruitment.161
As the war progressed, betrayals by Algerian soldiers
serving in the French forces increased, causing a sense
of paranoia in the ranks.162 With the exception of the
Aurès region, the situation during 1955 continued to
deteriorate throughout Algeria, escalating into guerrilla
warfare. The Aurès exception is attributed to Brigadier
General Gaston Palange’s “novel” pacification strategy,
which completely regained control of the population
by 1956.163 Unfortunately, the rest of the military was
slow to embrace Palange’s strategy, or at least it was
applied unevenly.
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As the war progressed, the FLN leadership
continually adapted its strategy and organization to
counter the French strategy. For instance, as a result of
a series of recent defeats, the CRUA leadership met to
reassess its strategy and reorganize its command and
control structure in the spring of 1956—the Soummam
Summit. Although the summit standardized the
military organization and centralized command and
control by reorganizing CRUA into a new supreme
body, the Comité de Coordination et d’Exécution (CCE),
the summit was also a power play by Ramdane
Abane, who shared power in the CCE with Krim and
M’hidi.164 Incidentally, his principal rival, Ben Bella,
was intercepted by the French a few months later while
on the way to Morocco and spent the rest of the war
in prison.165 When the French successfully scattered
the FLN leadership in 1957, the remaining leadership
met in Cairo to reorganize the CCE into a politicalmilitary body with an inner council of five military
representatives and one political representative,
Abane.166
It would appear that Abane had maneuvered
successfully to assume supreme power, but his
ambition and caustic criticisms of his colleagues led to
his assassination in December 1957.167 Abane’s death
was neither beneficial nor deleterious to the FLN—his
was just another death among dozens of key leaders,
who either died in combat with the French or through
internal purges. Of the original neuf historiques, only
Krim, who had escaped to Tunisia, remained (later
murdered by FLN chief Boumedienne in 1964).168
In September 1959, the FLN formed a government
in exile, the Gouvernement Provisoire de la Répulbique
(GPRA), which would serve as a body for negotiation
and immediate governance with the ending of
hostilities.169
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One of the most effective and enduring FLN
stratagems was internationalizing the conflict. Ben
Bella, operating primarily out of Cairo, solicited
various countries for financial support and arms, as
well as for broadcasting propaganda. When Tunisia
and Morocco gained independence from France in
March 1956, they provided sanctuary, and Tunisia later
served as an interlocutor for negotiations. Successful
lobbying secured an invitation in April 1955 for FLN
delegates to attend the Bandung Conference, which
included 29 Third World countries. The conference
not only provided the opportunity for greater financial
aid, but also opened the way for the FLN to have its
case brought before the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly in September 1955.170 The FLN gained world
attention during the Battle of Algiers from January
through October 1957. During this time, the brutality
of French operations, including the use of torture,
became well-known, which in turn led to worldwide
condemnation of France and constant international
pressure to end the conflict.171 The FLN also dispatched
two eloquent spokesmen, Abdelkader Chanderli and
M’hamed Yazid, to New York in order to garner support
from the United States and the UN. Cosmopolitan in
appearance and well-mannered, they courted American
academics and politicians. One of their greatest coups
was enlisting Senator John Kennedy to the FLN cause.
Senator Kennedy’s influential statements slowly turned
U.S. official policy against the French policy in Algeria.
Incredibly, France refused to publicize the extent of
FLN atrocities (complete with photos) to the United
States and the UN because it felt this was beneath its
diplomatic stature.172 The French did not appreciate
the power of the media, particularly film footage and
photos, in defending its policies, and lost an important
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front in the war. Paradoxically, even when FLN
atrocities were revealed, the public tended to blame
France for its inability to provide sufficient security.
Incidents, such as the French bombing of an FLN base
in the Tunisian village of Sakiet in 1957, created more
political backlash than military value because it killed
80 people, many of whom were women and children.
In response, Tunisian President Bourguiba demanded
the withdrawal of all French forces from Tunisia and
accused France of aggression before the UN Security
Council—another diplomatic disaster.173 Anti-French
sentiment in the international arena probably weighed
more heavily on de Gaulle than he would admit as he
assumed power in June 1958. Algeria had made France
one of the most reviled members in the UN, prompting
de Gaulle to seek an end to the war, even if under less
than ideal conditions.174
In sum, France’s greatest mistake was decoupling
political control from military strategy. The French
military successfully defanged the insurgency, but the
government was unable to translate that into political
effect. The pied noir served as a rogue state within the
state, toppling French governments that threatened
their position in Algeria. They acted as subjugators and
disdained any type of compromise with the Algerians.
Only de Gaulle had the political clout to engage
them successfully in a power struggle, and it nearly
cost him his life. In a Machiavellian manner, the FLN
eliminated all rival organizations and moderates with
whom the French might negotiate. With more pressing
domestic and foreign matters to deal with, de Gaulle
finally negotiated an end to the war in 1962 with the
FLN as the recognized government in exchange for
beneficial oil and nuclear testing treaties. In so many
ways, the FLN victory defied all logic of warfare, but
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its abilities to survive against all rivals, internationalize
the conflict, and exhaust French national will were its
trump cards. No doubt, these lessons were not lost
among subsequent Arab extremists.
Nicaragua, 1967-79.
State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was
the only revolutionary movement in Central America
that successfully seized power, primarily due to the
“personalistic, ‘neopatrimonial’ dictatorship” under
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who virtually alienated all
sectors of society.175
The Somoza style of governance was not novel
to Nicaragua though. James Mahoney premised that
its political character was largely shaped by past
U.S. interventions that interrupted socioeconomic
development in what he terms “aborted liberalism.”176
The Nicaraguan Liberal Party’s politicization of the
National Guard in the late 1920s, however, created
the system of patronage that permitted the Somoza
dynasty to rule directly or indirectly through puppet
governments from 1936 to 1979.177
The Somoza family used the National Guard to
distribute patronage to loyalists as well as preventing
the possibility of a military coup.178 When Anastasio
Somoza Debayle graduated from chief of the National
Guard to the presidency in 1967, he radicalized the
patronage system into a neopatrimonial or “sultanistic”
dictatorship.179 Unlike his father and older brother,
Somoza personalized his rule, using the National
Guard as an instrument of fear and repression in
addition to its traditional role of patronage.180 This
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change in governance greatly weakened the resilience
of the state to revolutionary challengers. Goodwin
suggests that Somoza’s rule marginalized moderate
political and social groups as well as co-opting and
weakening the political and economic elites. Loyalty,
affiliation, and nepotism (rather than merit, expertise,
and training) determined official appointments,
promotions, and business contracts. Consequently, the
elites had virtually no influence on the government and
were incapable of mobilizing coalitions in response to
revolutionary threats.181
Similarly, the Somoza government valued loyalty
over professionalism, and it prevented the formation
of military cliques by frequent rotations of officers in
positions of authority, early retirements or purges,
and the segregation of officers from social and political
circles.182 Predictably, the lack of military autonomy
not only prevented the National Guard from staging a
coup, but also prevented it from effectively countering
revolutionary movements.183
Any popular support Somoza enjoyed dropped
precipitously when he raked international aid earmarked for victims of the 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua. Hereafter, Somoza’s regime became progressively
more repressive as opposition groups began demanding
political change.184 Somoza appeared unfazed by public
reaction as he blatantly conspired with the Conservative
Party (i.e., the loyal opposition) to have the Constitution
revised to permit his reelection as president in 1974.185
The brittleness of Somoza’s political system became
more pronounced as political pressure mounted. In
essence, no political, economic, and military elites were
in positions of power to avert the FSLN revolution once
the regime began to crumble.
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Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups from
state power or resources. The Somoza regime made no
distinction between reformists and revolutionaries. The
National Guard indiscriminately attacked or arrested
suspected guerrillas and their alleged sympathizers,
“rural and urban unions, student groups, Christian
‘based communities’, priests and catechists, and moderate political parties and opposition figures. . . .”186
Whenever labor or social groups staged protests, the
National Guard reacted immediately to crush them
and arrest their leaders. Thousands were literally
slaughtered, leading not only to the elimination of
moderate reformist groups, but also the migration of
the people into the ranks of the FSLN for self-preservation.187 By eliminating all other political alternatives,
Somoza unintentionally forced Nicaraguan society to
choose between his repressive regime and the revolutionary FSLN. Given no other recourse, the FSLN
became the popular choice by default.
Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming state violence
against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures.
The exclusionary and repressive practices of the
Somoza regime drove its citizens into the FSLN, which
created enclaves in Nicaragua’s isolated north central
region. Founded by three political activists in 1961,
the FSLN never numbered more than a few hundred
members until the insurgency gained momentum in
1978. Thereafter, FSLN guerrillas grew from 500 in 1978
to over 5,000 in July 1979. Politically, the Sandinistas
expanded their basis of legitimacy by the incorporation
of diverse groups from society into their ranks,
forming a broad-based political coalition. In a matter
of 2 years, the revolutionary movement expanded
from the “Group of Twelve,” to the Broad Opposition
Front, to the United People’s Movement, and finally to
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the National Patriotic Front, encompassing dozens of
organizations.188
Goodwin suggests that the FSLN would not have
commanded such a broad-based coalition under normal
circumstances. However, the citizens increasingly
viewed the Somoza government as complicit in
corruption and an obstacle to reforms. The various
groups coalesced against a common enemy under
the umbrella of the FSLN, especially since no single
political or social opposition group could effect change
alone. Unlike his father and brother, Somoza did not
even try to rule indirectly, which flagrantly flaunted
the illegitimacy of his regime. Lastly, the Sandinistas
provided security and some public goods, which the
Somoza regime neglected.189 Few dictatorships have
displayed such self-destructive behavior.
Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power. The
FSLN enclave in the remote north-central region of
Nicaragua was provided sufficient succor from National
Guard incursions.190 Certainly the mountainous terrain
contributed to the Sandinista movement’s security, but
more importantly, the network of Sandinista-allied
peasants prevented the National Guard from collecting
intelligence on Sandinista camps and leadership.191
Earlier, the peasant informers had provided such
intelligence, which the National Guard used with great
effect in hunting down and killing Sandinista leaders.192
However, in the interim, the regime policy of expelling
peasants from their homeland to make room for large
cattle ranches embittered the peasants, who, in turn,
gave assistance to the Sandinistas.193 Gaining the
support of the peasants was certainly a coup that could
not have come about without regime hubris. Previously,
the peasants had no reason to trust the light-skinned,
college educated, urban revolutionaries.194 Hence, the
National Guard lost its means of intelligence collection,
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which was crucial for its counterinsurgency missions.
Secure training camps in Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Nicaragua permitted the Sandinistas to train guerrilla
forces unmolested, which permitted the number
of guerrillas to reach 5,000 for the final offensive
in 1979. Still, the National Guard numbered 14,000
from 1978 onwards, and, given its superior training
and equipment, should have been able to dominate
the guerrillas. The number of militants is deceptive,
however, since they were often supplemented with
auxiliaries not only for combat operations but also
for organization and logistics.195 The FSLN strategy
of over-extending the National Guard by launching
simultaneous insurrections in several cities and towns
in early July 1979 was effective. Faced with the expanded
ranks of the Sandinistas, the National Guard quickly
exhausted its ammunition stocks through combat and
loss of arsenals. Replenishment of ammunition was
not possible, given the U.S. arms embargo. It became
apparent by mid-July that the combat power of the
National Guard was diminishing as the Sandinista’s
was growing. Inexorably, the Sandinistas closed on
Managua until it fell on July 20. Nevertheless, 50,000
Nicaraguan deaths attest to the brutality of the conflict,
reflecting the degree the regime clung to power.196
Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that
alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites.
Somoza’s neopatrimonial rule created the conditions
for revolutionary change. He used patronage and
corruption to control subordinate authorities as well as
to enrich himself.197 Somoza used the state mechanisms
to monopolize business dealings, thereby alienating the
economic elites. His skimming of aid for the earthquake
relief, as well as his awarding reconstruction contracts
to his own companies, is the most oft-cited example
of his personalized corruption. The assassination of
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Pedro Chamorro in January 1978 galvanized business
and intellectual elites to form the “Group of Twelve”
as a political opposition group.198 Somoza’s obduracy
during negotiations with the Broad Opposition Front
(FAO) and the assassination of FAO member Luis Flores
in January 1979 ended any hopes among moderates of
a peaceful settlement.199
Somoza may have felt his rule was unassailable.
The National Guard was unquestionably loyal and
his instrument of repression. He undoubtedly felt
the United States would ultimately not risk losing
Nicaragua to the communist Sandinistas. However,
the end of the negotiations convinced uncommitted
elites to ally with the FSLN and support the FAO
general strike in May 1979, which virtually shut down
the country.200
The regime was increasingly isolated from the
international arena, especially from the United States
which had already cut off military aid. Moreover,
various Latin American countries began to infiltrate
weapons to the Sandinistas through Panama and Costa
Rica. Meanwhile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and
Brazil had already severed relations with the regime.
International isolation became pronounced when the
Central American Defense Council severed its support
of Somoza on June 13, 1979. The Organization of
America States demanded Somoza’s resignation on
June 21, blocking a U.S. Secretary of State initiative
to deploy an inter-American peacekeeping force
into Nicaragua.201 In light of the groundswell of
political and popular opposition as well as Somoza’s
neopatrimonial rule, the departure of Somoza on July
17, 1979, caused the disintegration of the National
Guard as well as his Liberal National Party. As the
vanguard of the revolutionary movement, the FSLN
assumed uncontested control of the government.202
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The competence of the insurgent leadership to develop and
execute a successful strategy. The 1972 earthquake relief
corruption scandal provided the greatest opportunity
for the FSLN to gain adherents, especially among the
intellectuals and wealthy elites. Yet, despite some
minor guerrilla successes, the National Guard was still
able to crush Sandinista groups at will, as the ambush
and killing of key leader Carlos Fonseca underscored
on November 8, 1976.203
Humberto Ortega recognized that the beloved
“foco” theory of insurgency, with its center in urban
areas, had a poor chance of succeeding in Nicaragua.204
Ortega reasoned that Somoza’s arbitrary and
pervasive repression offered an excellent opportunity
to overthrow the regime, using a carefully nurtured
popular coalition. Nonetheless, attracting the disparate
organizations and groups to the FSLN would not result
simply because they shared a common enemy. The
FSLN had to be seen as a progressive organization that
mollified fears. Ortega’s May 4, 1977, FSLN strategy
paper outlined the following guidelines: First, omit
all leftist rhetoric from the program; second, include
non-Marxist opposition groups in the anti-Somoza
coalition; third, create mass organizations to support
the FSLN; fourth, radicalize opposition moderates
through agitation activities; fifth, weaken the National
Guard by military action; and sixth, unify the FSLN
under a joint leadership.205
Ortega’s broad coalition tack produced the
desired results. The Sandinistas gained substantive
political power in 1977 upon forming the “Group of
Twelve,” which comprised “prominent anti-Somoza
businesspeople, academics, and intellectuals. . . .”206
Although forced to flee Nicaragua, the group still
organized opposition groups within Nicaragua, as
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well as lobbying for international pressure on the
regime.207 The Sandinistas skillfully formed various
labor and political organizations into political fronts,
creating a “broad ‘multi-class populist coalition’ that
included workers and peasants, students and youth,
middle-class folk, and part of Nicaragua’s elite.”208 Coopting these opposition groups also ensured that the
FSLN would take the lead in negotiations, as well as
controlling the instruments of power.209
Perhaps one of the Sandinistas greatest accomplishments was the international isolation of the Somoza
regime diplomatically. The Carter administration was
certainly disenchanted with Somoza’s human rights
record but was nonetheless committed to the Cold War
Containment Strategy. Accordingly, the Sandinistas
strove to portray themselves to the United States as
a “democratic and popular opposition to the corrupt
and brutal Somoza regime.”210 Their key international
spokesmen were respected moderates and leaders
in the coalition, who used the Western media, select
clergymen, and peace groups in the United States to
propagate the message that the Somoza regime must be
replaced with a moderate, representative government.
The Sandinistas maintained offices in Washington, DC,
and New York, providing information to Congress, the
White House, the UN, and international organizations.
Once on the scent, the Western media brought to light
National Guard atrocities and excesses to the world.
In November 1978, the International Monetary Fund,
as well as other international organizations and banks,
cut its loan packages with Nicaragua.211
These efforts set the conditions for the April 1979
uprisings, some instigated by the Sandinistas and
others self-generated by the locals. Somoza’s obstinacy
during negotiations certainly fed into Ortega’s
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plans. The coup de grace against the regime in April
comprised three fronts: a general strike throughout the
country to shut down the cities; popular uprisings in
six major cities; and a series of guerrilla attacks in the
north and west, converging on Managua. The National
Guard, spread thin attempting to defend everywhere,
proved unable to defend anything. Consequently, the
Sandinistas were able to end the armed struggle of the
campaign in less than 60 days.212
In short, compared to most revolutionary movements, the FSLN resorted more to subversion by coalition than violence against the regime. Furthermore,
once the conflict began, the isolation of the Somoza
regime was so complete, its collapse was rapid if albeit
sanguinary.
Conclusions.
The revolutionary movements and associated
wars in South Vietnam, Algeria, and Nicaragua were
fundamentally different in terms of their approach
to overthrowing the established governments. Nonetheless, the political context behind the formation of
the revolutionary movements provides the common
thread. What is remarkable is the degree to which all
three governments contributed to the alienation of their
societies, providing the opportunity for revolutionary
movements to challenge the regime through the people.
Goodwin reminds us that in ordinary circumstances,
the citizenry would not seek such an association, but
when it sees no other way out of a predicament which
the government has instigated, it will join whoever
provides greater security.
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The degree of competency displayed by the
revolutionary leadership cannot be divorced from
its ultimate success. If the leadership lacks the
organizational and political skills to capitalize on
or create government mistakes, the insurgency may
collapse or just smolder for years. In all three cases,
the regimes fought back ruthlessly over a prolonged
period.
Of the three revolutionary movements, the FSLN
appears to have exercised the greatest politicalmilitary acuity. It was able to isolate the Somoza
regime and garner a popular movement, more through
political subversion and propaganda than through a
protracted war of violence. The international isolation
of the Somoza regime deprived the National Guard
of its critical external military assistance needed for
a prolonged struggle. Certainly, the final months of
armed conflict were costly for the FSLN, but without its
stockpiles, the National Guard likely could not prevail
militarily.
The Viet Cong leadership rashly and recklessly
pursued armed conflict to such an extent that U.S.
intervention became a certainty. The historical record
of the Diem regime suggests it was well on its way
to self-destruction even without the NLF needing to
escalate the conflict to a guerrilla war. This strategic
error not only led to the destruction of the Viet Cong
guerrillas and cadre in 1968, but also to the elimination
of the NLF infrastructure and the peace treaty with
North Vietnam by 1972. That North Vietnam resorted
to a conventional invasion of South Vietnam in 1975
attests to the degree of the NLF’s defeat.
The Algerian FLN leadership deserves neither
grudging respect nor emulation. Its wanton brutality
to civilians, both European and Algerian, alone
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deserves condemnation. The war’s descent into
barbarity must be laid squarely on the FLN regardless
of the circumstances leading up to the conflict. The
FLN prosecuted an inferior strategy to the French,
resulting in the elimination of its infrastructure and
dispersion of its leadership. Arguably, the insurgency
became a tertiary issue compared to threat posed by
the pied noir and the military to the authority of the
French government. De Gaulle’s subsequent actions
imply a change in priorities: first, to break the power
of the pied noir; second, to put the military back in its
place. De Gaulle’s recognition of the FLN government
in exchange for lucrative agreements became the
unavoidable consequence of asserting government
authority over these internal challenges. Hence, the
FLN assumed the reigns of power by default and not
by triumph.
Strategic Insights.
The three case studies reveal the substantive degree
to which a government creates the conditions and the
opportunities for an insurgency to flourish. As the
United States considers rendering counterinsurgency
assistance to a beleaguered state, it must debate the
roots of the insurgency. Government malpractice will
not dissipate with the infusion of substantial military
and financial assistance. These are merely metaphorical
pain killers for a chronically ill patient. In such cases,
the United States should not be drawn into a conflict for
fear that the revolutionary government will pose a dire
threat to U.S. national security. If the new government
does become a threat, then the United States can take
concrete steps to deal with it. Otherwise, the United
States will find itself propping up dubious governments
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(as it practiced during the Cold War) in a replay of the
zero-sum game.
If the United States decides to render counterinsurgency assistance, Goodwin’s framework for
government practices is a good tool for analyzing the
client state’s political system. Bard O’Neill warns that
government advisors should understand the human
milieu as part of their job preparation. “A careful and
unbiased assessment of demography, social structures
and values, economic trends, the political culture, and
the structure and performance of the political system”
will assist the advisor in identifying the roots of the
insurgency and policy obstacles.213 He also warns
not to rely on the client government’s understanding
of its own people. If the government were attuned
to the grievances of the people, there would be no
insurgency.214
In the realm of security assistance, the government
must address the immediate threat of the insurgency,
which is a bottom-up approach. Building national
security forces, as well as focusing on the national
government and economic development, yields
benefits in the long term, but they will not resolve the
immediate insurgent threat. Ignoring the burgeoning
insurgency in the hope that national security forces,
political reform, and economic benefits will trickle
down and eventually smother the insurgency entails
great risks and generally results in a protracted
insurgency.
The supreme task of the counterinsurgency effort is
to gain positive control of the population by providing
every population center with a permanent security
force. The front line in a counterinsurgency is where
the people live. Whether the local authorities raise their
own police and/or militia forces or rely on coalition

53

cadres to do the same, such permanent security forces
are the sine qua non for a counterinsurgency strategy.
Without this solid foundation, all other development
and construction efforts will be for naught.
The comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy
focuses on renewing the ties between the central
government and the local authorities. In light of the
significant damage insurgencies inflict on local societies,
initiating immediate construction and development
projects for villages and towns allows the local population to enjoy the benefits of the established government. The establishment of a UN reconstruction
and development coordination center could serve
to harmonize, coordinate, and monitor construction
and development projects among the international
organizations, nongovernment organizations, government organizations, provincial reconstruction teams,
and various engineer units in country. A national
coordination center serves as a clearing center for
legitimate organizations and prevents fraud, conflicts,
redundancies, and waste, which inevitably result when
separate organizations are left on their own.
The United States must remain attentive to the
messages it sends to the client government. Surfeiting
the government with million of dollars in aid and
assistance, along with a large military contingent,
not only feeds corruption and waste, it also cues the
government that the United States will remain in
the country indefinitely. In such cases, client states
create a mutual dependence relationship with their
patron states, feeding on the latter’s fear of failure.
Hence, when developing the right counterinsurgency
balance, the United States should err on the side of a
minimum footprint because the opposite tack seems
to retard government reforms and assumption of the
counterinsurgency burden.215
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Because it is initially weak, an insurgency relies
a great deal on propaganda in order to increase
recruitment, financing, and international assistance.
Additionally, propaganda serves to fetter the efforts
of the government by using its existing laws, legal
system, and political process as well as domestic and
world opinion to insurgent advantage. Insurgents
have long regarded cities as the most effective venue
for propaganda. Any event—whether a terrorist act,
excessive use of government force, or demonstrations—
which takes place in a city receives immediate and
extensive (even overblown) media attention. The cold
reality is insurgents need only to ply some propaganda
and sit back as a host of forces begin lambasting the
government combating the insurgency.
The United States must have an agency dedicated to
information operations for the international community
and the beleaguered state. Winning the war of ideas
must be integral to the counterinsurgency strategy. It
is not a wise idea, however, for a U.S. administration to
target the American people, including Congress, with
information operations. It is much better to give the
domestic audience a sober appraisal of the unfolding
situation rather than try to bolster confidence with
exuberant optimism. As the Johnson administration
learned, such operations create a credibility gap and
an inevitable backlash if a setback occurs (i.e., the 1968
Tet Offensive).
Recommendations.
U.S. National Security Strategy must take into
account the unique circumstances behind every
insurgency and be circumspect when considering the
level and type of involvement in a counterinsurgency.
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The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are
likely anomalies because regime change preceded
the insurgency. The most likely national security
scenario will be rendering assistance to an established
government. Hence, political-military engagement
with dysfunctional governments should focus on the
following:
• Using the political context framework as a
reference, U.S. political and military advisors
must take every diplomatic opportunity with
their counterparts to underscore the deleterious
effects of dysfunctional governance and the
danger of inaction or half-measures against
inchoate insurgencies.
• In preparation for their mission, advisors must
understand the demographics, social structures
and values, the real economic system, the political
culture, and the structure and performance
of the political system. This preparation not
only assists the advisor understand the roots
of the insurgency and anticipate government
intransigence, but also provides awareness of
counterproductive or inflammatory reforms.
• The U.S. Government must remain cognizant
of the substantive advantages an established
government has over insurgents and not rush to
intervene. The introduction of coalition ground
forces carries ramifications above the rendering
of security. The client government may relax
its counterinsurgency efforts, a burden the
coalition soon shoulders. With the immediate
threat abates, the government may see no need
to reform government practices; and the larger
the military contingent, the more difficult it is
to extract the political commitment without
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the stigma of failure. Hence, a minimum
assistance package provides maximum political
flexibility.
• The centerpiece of any counterinsurgency
strategy is separating the insurgents from the
population. How that is accomplished is a matter
of strategy, but the historical record suggests
military operations targeting insurgents alone
are rarely successful. Allowing the establishment
of local police and militia, either through local
authorities or coalition cadre trainers, is the
most effective way to provide security for the
population centers. Thereafter, construction
and development initiatives can begin in those
areas where security is established.
• Like security, construction and development
initiatives have the greatest effect at the local
level. Construction projects which build what
the townspeople want, use local labor, and
provide training and salaries, are the best way
to spur the local economy and to ensure the
people defend the completed projects.
• The establishment of a UN reconstruction
and development coordination center could
serve to harmonize, coordinate, and monitor
construction and development projects among
the international organizations, nongovernment
organizations, government organizations, provincial reconstruction teams, and various engineer units in country. A national coordination
center serves as a clearing center for legitimate
organizations and prevents fraud, conflicts,
redundancies, and waste, which inevitably
result when separate organizations are left on
their own.
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• The use of a sophisticated information operations
to inform, persuade, and inspire the affected
population and rebut insurgent propaganda is
a prerequisite to counterinsurgency success. On
the other hand, it is not a wise idea, and perhaps
illegal, for a U.S. administration to target the
American people, including Congress, with
information operations and even expansive
strategic communications. It is much better to
give the domestic audience a sober appraisal of
the unfolding situation rather than try to bolster
confidence with exuberant optimism. To do
so risks creating a credibility gap and possible
political backlash if a setback occurs.
Most experts agree that the war on terror will
last years. To meet this challenge without emptying
the national coffers and placing severe strains on
military readiness, the United States should adopt a
circumspect national security policy. States involved
in an insurgency rarely need military intervention on a
large scale. A bit of political-military finesse will serve
U.S. interests far more than viewing every insurgency
as a zero-sum game.
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